Who: YOU! (Hopefully)
What: A benefit and awareness night for genocide in Africa.
When: April 11, 2007 // Doors at 9pm
Where: The Plaza Club (881 Granville Street)
How: For tickets, contact us via email (neveragainisagain@gmail.com), call 604.710.1175, or visit The Outpost on UBC campus. Ten dollars gets you admission and a free drink, and every penny goes directly to the film Rwanda: Hope Rises. TICKETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE DOOR!!!!
And now a bit more:
As most of you know, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan, has claimed at least 200,000 lives so far, with many more victims of violence, sexual atrocities, and displacement. Our goal is to raise awareness about the conflict in Darfur, but also to raise money for the film Rwanda: Hope Rises. This is the project of a local Vancouver filmmaker, whose work gives a voice to a nation that is rebuilding itself after the genocide of 1994. Each one of the 800,000+ people who were killed in the Rwandan genocide had a heartbeat, a soul, and a future. Darfur is not Rwanda, but the film is a reminder of the humanity and value of the African people, and of what can happen when the international community suffers from apathy or gets caught up in definitions. A clip of the film will be shown during the evening, so that you can get an idea of where your money is going. So, it’s going to be a great night of dancing and hanging out, but also a fantastic opportunity to find out how we can—and why we should—speak out against genocide. It might be as simple as informing yourself about the crisis in Darfur, or signing Amnesty International’s “Protect the People of Darfur” petition. It could be talking to someone about how you can become more involved.
The catch: TICKETS MUST BE PURCHASED IN ADVANCE! No tickets will be sold at the door, and we are not allowed to sell tickets within 3 blocks of The Plaza on the night of the event. Tickets are available on UBC campus at The Outpost, or by contacting us. We’ll do our very best to get a ticket to you!
Please consider coming out, and please spread the word; we need to sell tickets for this event to be a success, so forward this email and tell your friends, cousins, pets, etc. to come out and join us.
Check out www.neveragainisagain.wordpress.com (a work currently in progress) for more information. We plan to continue working on this as an on-going project over the next few months.
Hope to see you all there!
Sara
p.s. – If you can’t make it, but would like to contribute to this cause, please let me know; we’re grateful for your support.
There are approximately 7,000 African Union (AU) troops in Sudan right now, whose purpose is to provide protection for humanitarian workers. This works out to just over 3 soldiers for every 100km of land. Comparatively, there are currently 11 soldiers for every 100km of land in Bosnia, 10 years after the conflict ended. Some estimate that 44,000 troops would be needed for any effective patrolling and protection of the area.
Their main focus is Southern Sudan, and supporting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These troops have a mandate that is supported by the Sudanese government in Khartoum, but it is a weak mandate, and must be renewed every six months. And so, while one may argue that providing better resources for the AU troops would provide an avenue through which to pursue peace in the Darfur region, there are several problems.
First, they are not in the Darfur region; second, they are unable to plan for the long term because they do not have the resources. Third, the AU mandate allows troops to protect humanitarian workers only. This means that, for example, if an AU soldier were to witness a Darfuri civilian being raped and beaten, he would not be able to defend that person under the mandate. Finally, should the AU prove effective, it is likely that the Sudanese government would not renew the mandate at the end of the next six month period. The likelihood of this last scenario would not likely occur anyway; the AU is VERY supported of national sovereignty, for reciprocity purposes.
[Note: Many of these statistics were provided by experts at the Failing, Failed & Fragile States Conference, held at the University of British Columbia in March, 2007.]
- sara
Fellow UBC student Dave Steinbach has put together an excellent and accessible bibliography for further information on the Darfur conflict, and Sudan in general.
For a general background on conflict history and peacekeeping efforts in Sudan, the Accord publication is invaluable and can be located at: http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/sudan/contents.php.
Eric Reeves’ website is also incredibly useful, as he’ll post a new article on a weekly basis about the continuing crises in Sudan. If you’re willing to search through his database, you’ll find some great articles coming from one of the leading advocates for international support in Sudan. Located at http://www.sudanreeves.org
In addition, the Global Security website has a lot of background information but it is somewhat incoherent and more difficult to sift through:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm
For data on political and social indicators, as well as for an update report on human rights issues, there are a whole range of NGOs and research institutions that write valuable reports on Darfur and Southern Sudan. It is essential to look at:
1) Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org
2) Transparency International www.transparency.org
3) Failed States Index http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php
4) CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html
5) International Crisis Group www.icg.org
6) Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org
Needless to say, there are many more For the most reliable statistics on social services, the World Bank is by far the most accurate and comprehensive resource (despite many people’s objections to their actual policies) If you have time it is really worthwhile to read some of their reports that outline potential development projects, especially the ones on health, sanitation, and education. The reports can be found at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/0,
,menuPK:375449~pagePK:64026187~piPK:141126~theSitePK:375422,00.html
Also, data on the sheer poverty of Southern Sudan can be read in the JAM report at
http://www.dep.no/ud/english/topics/sudan/conference/all/032041-120006/dok-bn.html
Like the World Bank for development statistics, the IMF website has the most accurate statistics on macroeconomic performance, and they do an excellent job in outlining the reliance of Sudan’s economy on the oil industry. It can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06182.pdf
Canada’s response to the situation in Darfur and Southern Sudan can be documented on the CIDA, DFAIT and DoD websites. They are:
1) CIDA: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-217124359-NT2?OpenDocument
2) DFAIT: https://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadasudan/backgrounder-contributions-en.asp
3) DoD: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/augural/index_e.asp
Finally, if you are interested in reading about what is currently happening in Sudan it is best to regularly read the BBC news at http://news.bbc.co.uk where there is a story almost every day. You can also read the archives to find some key information that may have happened in the past year.
(The complete backgrounder in pdf can be found here.)
- sara
In Sudan, Canada’s efforts are mainly channeled into providing financial support for humanitarian projects in Southern Sudan as well as supporting AMIS as it attempts to bring stability to Darfur.
We can surely be proud that our government has taken Sudan as a priority and has provided them with a total of $300 million to help stabilize the country. It is even admirable that “Canada supports the transition from an African Union mission in Darfur to a United Nations mission consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1706, including a stronger mandate for protection of civilian populations and personnel from the United Nations and other humanitarian aid organizations.” Yet many believe that not enough is being done. Canadian Senator and (retired) Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire – the Force Commander for the UN mission in Rwanda in 1994 – has been incredibly outspoken about the lack of concrete international action on Darfur. In an op-ed in The Globe and Mail on September 14th, 2006 entitled ‘History will judge Canada, not Sudan on the fate of Darfur’ Dallaire claims that the responsibility to intervene in Darfur to stop human rights abuses lies on the Canadian government. He argues that the Security Council has done their job in authorizing force through Resolution 1706 – a legally binding document that does not actually require the consent of the government of Sudan – and that since major powers like Britain and the US are tied-up in Iraq, the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), a Canadian initiated doctrine, lies on the middle powers of the world like Canada, Germany, India, and Japan. He goes on to argue that we have 1,200 soldiers to offer as an initial combat force, but what we don’t have, just like the rest of the world, is political will.
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Big thanks to Dave for putting together this information. The complete backgrounder (with citations) can be found here.
- sara
The participation of the international community in helping the Sudanese people is crucial because, as we have seen, the government of Sudan is unable, or unwilling to protect them from violence or provide them with the basic necessities of life. To this extent, the international community has only had marginal success in solving the problems that persist.
To their credit, there has been active engagement in Southern Sudan during and after the negotiation of the CPA. Most importantly, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1590 which created the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) who were given the mandate of monitoring the ceasefire between the north and south and repatriating refugees. However, the international community is having difficulty responding to the Darfur crisis. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union authorized a 7,000 strong force to the region in 2004, but they are currently unable to maintain any security for civilians in the region, let alone protect the imperative aid operations by groups like MSF and the Red Cross. Due to the under-funded and under-manned AU mission, many, including former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, have publicly called for a UN peacekeeping mission to the region of 17,300 troops. The Security Council even managed to pass a Resolution 1706 which determined that “the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security” and authorized peacekeepers to be deployed. However, the international community has so far been lacking the collective will to back this Resolution as they remain adamant over obtaining consent from the government of Sudan for the deployment of UN troops. Part of this stalling is at the behest of China who has significant state-owned energy contracts in the Sudanese oil fields, and does not want to disrupt their friendly business relations with the Sudanese government. Thus, while hundreds of people continue to die every day, diplomats are focusing their efforts on pressuring al-Bashir to authorize some sort of UN involvement in Darfur. Although there appeared to be a breakthrough in November 2006 on the possibility of a joint AU-UN peacekeeping force, the government of Sudan remains adamant that the UN role would remain one of “logistical and financial support”. For at least the foreseeable future in 2007 it seems unlikely that Sudan’s position will change, nor will that of NGO or the many international governments like Canada who support intervention but are unwilling to supply troops. One positive step was announced on January 29th, 2007 when it was decided at the 8th African Union Summit that Sudan would be bypassed for the second straight year in their bid to retain the AU presidency. Instead the responsibility was given it to Ghana, a democratic country who, with some hope, can use their position on the Security Council to liaise between the AU and UN and push for real change in Darfur in the coming months.
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Big thanks to Dave for putting together this information. The complete backgrounder (with citations) can be found here.
- sara
Using our working definition of a failed state as “a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders”, it is easy to see where Sudan fits in this picture. Quite simply put, the government of Sudan is actively pursuing the destruction of a large segment of its population in Darfur (where there are about 4 million people). Or, as Michael Walzer has said, “when a government turns savagely on its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply.” Empirical evidence also backs up the claim that Sudan is a failed state. The Fund for Peace produces the annual ‘Failed States Index’; Sudan was ranked third in 2005, the first publication of the Index, and first in 2006. However, it cannot be said that Sudan tops the list solely because the government is perpetuating genocide, or at the least ethnic cleansing, against its own population. Although that certainly is the leading reason, there is a complex web of interrelating social, political, and economic factors that combine to classify Sudan as a failed state.
First, it is essential to attest to the poverty and human suffering in Sudan. The best indicators for this are the infant mortality rate and average life expectancy because they outline the ability for one to take care of themselves in the form of basic necessities such as food and healthcare, and assaults to ones livelihood like war or famine. Most statistics estimate that the infant mortality rate in Sudan is 6.1% and the average life expectancy is 58.9 years – both of which fall in the bottom third of world statistics. However, recent World Bank reports indicate that in some parts of the country infant mortality is up to 25%, showing the devastating effects of decades of conflict in Southern Sudan and more recently in Darfur.
Indeed these statistics attest to the overall lack of infrastructure in Sudan of key social services. For example, safe drinking water, the most essential resource for one’s health and livelihood, cannot be obtained by 75% of the population, while in some rural regions access is limited to 14%. In addition, an estimated 70% of the population does not have appropriate access to sanitary facilities which leads to high rates of disease including typhoid, hepatitis A, and bacterial diarrhea. Shortages of sanitation facilities are so acute that fewer than 50% of schools and hospitals have safe water or sanitary latrines. Health facilities are also in short supply after prolonged conflicts have destroyed hospitals and clinics throughout the country. This has led to the spread of easily preventable diseases like measles where nearly half of newborn children are not inoculated. Finally, education infrastructure is equally poor as only 60.1% of children were enrolled in primary school in 2004 with a drop to 32.8% for secondary school. This means that the vast majority of Sudanese drop out of school before they reach high school. Yet, if all these numbers did not already attest to the sheer poverty and lack of government ability to protect its citizens, when we examine the differences between north and south, the data is truly shocking. In Southern Sudan, 90% of the population is poor and 48% of children are malnourished. Furthermore, only 22% are enrolled in school – a third of the national average – with only 11% of girls in school. This contributes to a 70% illiteracy rate, making Southern Sudan the worst area of the world in terms of access to education.
Second, it is important to examine the level of civic and political freedoms in Sudan. Freedom House, the leading NGO in mapping freedom and liberties around the world classifies Sudan as “not free” because the population is unable to exercise its popular will in fair elections. They point to December 2000 where opposition parties – believed to be supported by the majority of Sudanese – boycotted elections “in protest of what they said were attempts by a totalitarian regime to impart the appearance of fairness”. While the government continues to suppress the political will and free speech of its people, it also scores the lowest in the world in protection of fundamental human rights in the Failed States Index. The vast majority of deaths occur because of malnutrition, poor sanitation, little safe drinking water, and lack of access to the most basic health facilities. It is no surprise, then, that in its annual Corruption Perception Index which measures how international experts and average citizens of each country perceive their government’s accountability, Transparency International ranked Sudan 156 of 163 countries, amongst the dubious company of Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Bangladesh.
Finally, it is essential to analyze the security situation in Sudan. When performing country risk analysis, one of the most important indicators is regional volatility and contagion as conflict is likely to spill over across borders in the form of rebel groups or displaced persons. In the case of Sudan, it shares a mostly porous, undefended border with eight different countries in one of the most unstable regions of the world. For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army of northern Uganda, a brutal rebel group known for its widespread use of amputations and recruitment of child soldiers, frequently takes refuge in Southern Sudan. In addition, Sudan shares a small section of border with the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo where there has been fighting between various ethnic militias over control of illegal mining activity. There is also the possibility of regional instability should there be conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two neighbouring countries which have longstanding issues that nearly rose into all-out war in 2005. Finally, there is the extremely fragile situation in Chad whose government has declared war with Sudan as a result of cross-border raids by janjaweed militias and the recent outpour of over 200,000 refugees into Chad.
Over the past two decades in Sudan, mostly under the rule of Omar al-Bashir, 2.5 million people have died as a result of violent conflict and at least six million people have been displaced –some, likely more than once. This accounts for over 20% of Sudan’s 40 million people. With these numbers it is impossible to deny that Sudan is a failed state as it cannot offer its population security from internal threats. Overall, the indicators that describe access to social services, political freedoms, and regional stability back this claim up as the government is furthermore unable to secure basic human rights for its own people. The abysmal performance of Sudan in addressing the needs of its population is a result of decades of political instability which created barriers to development in regions outside Khartoum. The devastating effects are still being felt across the country.
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Big thanks to Dave for putting together this information. The complete backgrounder (with citations) can be found here.
- sara
While efforts to reestablish security and bring redevelopment to the south and east are huge tasks for the government, the most urgent issue pressing Sudan right now is in the western region of Darfur where conflict has been increasing in severity since its beginning in 2003. The conflict began when two rebel groups – JEM and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) – launched attacks against government posts, garrisons, and police stations, claiming that for years the government had neglected the Darfur region and inadequately addressed its financial and humanitarian needs. With most of its troops still involved in the south, the government responded by backing local militias known as the janjaweed to repress the rebellion. For three years the janjaweed have terrorized the region, forcing up to two million people to flee their homes in the greatest case of ethnic cleansing in the 21st century. International advocacy organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented the human rights violations by the janjaweed, claiming that they are using systematic rape as a weapon, targeting the killing of women and children, reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, and massacring dozens of people at a time. Furthermore, the United States government has publicly called the crisis in Darfur genocide, although for political reasons the United Nations Security Council has failed to echo these sentiments.
Adding to the chaos in Darfur, several hundred thousand refugees have crossed the western border into neighbouring Chad and Central African Republic which threatens to destabilize the wider region. Janjaweed militias have frequently crossed the porous border and attacked Darfuri refugees, which prompted Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare war on Sudan whom he claims is destabilizing Chad and supporting rebels that wish to overthrow him. Yet despite the grievances between Sudan and Chad, and despite the appalling brutality of the ongoing conflict in Darfur, the situation remains dire for the millions of people at risk. In May, 2006 negotiations between rebels and the government led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), but only one rebel faction – the SLM led by Minni Minnawi – signed the agreement, thereby ensuring that it would not provide a comprehensive grounds for peace in the region. Since then, fighting has intensified rather than decreased, with the direct targeting of humanitarian agencies being used as a new tactic aimed to demoralize them and ensure that they cannot provide assistance to those most at risk. Moreover, an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force of 7,000 personnel has proven insufficient in protecting civilians as they lack troops and military equipment to fight the better armed janjaweed forces. To date, the United Nations has also shown its reluctance to act, as objections from China and Russia on the Security Council continue to prevent any peacekeeping response without the consent of the Sudanese government – the very same administration which is backing the current atrocities. Until the UN can uphold its ‘responsibility to protect’, wide scale atrocities will continue in Darfur where people are dying every day of starvation and targeted killing. While many media estimates pinpoint the number of casualties in Darfur around 200,000 thus far, more recent accounts estimate that some 400,000 to 450,000 have people have died.
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Big thanks to Dave for putting together this information. The complete backgrounder (with citations) can be found here.
- sara
Most of Sudan’s history since independence in 1956 has been dominated by a series of core-periphery conflicts that have served to undermine the legitimacy of the state. The root cause of these regional divisions can be traced back, in-part, to the colonial era and the Closed District Ordinance in 1922 which essentially closed off the borders between the north and the south, creating two separate colonial administrations. When it was decided in the ‘Sudanization’ plan leading up to independence that the two regions would join to form a unified country it became quite clear that the political elite were dominated by the north, while the south remained tremendously underdeveloped in comparison. In response to their perceived dominance by the north, in 1955 thousands of southern military personnel mutinied and fled into neighbouring countries; there they launched a low intensity war against the government. Initially a disorganized group of rebels, the movement became a coherent political and military entity who eventually united as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) headed by Joseph Lagu.
Meanwhile, politics in Khartoum, dominated by the northern elite, were tumultuous as well. In 1969 Gaafar Nimeiry became the fifth President of Sudan in thirteen years, by way of a military coup. He briefly lost power in a coup in 1971 that was in turn defeated by his own supporters shortly afterwards, landing him back in the seat of power. Nimeiry used his powers to finally negotiate an end to the seventeen-year conflict between the north and south in 1972 by granting the SSLM significant regional autonomy and making Sudan a secular state, outlined in the Addis Ababa Agreement. By the end of the conflict, however, several hundred thousand people had been displaced and half a million had died.
Relative peace lasted in Sudan for over a decade, yet there were two important factors that aggravated tensions between the north and the south. The first was the discovery of oil in Southern Sudan in 1977 and the second was Nimeiry’s alignment with Islamic groups to consolidate his power in the early 1980s. The latter led to his declaration of Sharia law in 1983 that applied to non-Muslims and the South Sudanese, in explicit violation of the 1972 ceasefire. In response southern forces mobilized as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under the leadership of John Garang, displacing four million people and killing almost two million. The conflict officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9th, 2005 following two years of negotiations. The most notable provisions of the CPA give Southern Sudan regional autonomy for six years at which point a referendum of succession will take place, require a re-writing of the constitution to exempt non-Muslims and members of Southern Sudan from Sharia law, give key government ministry positions to members of SPLM as part of a Government of National Unity (GNU), and split oil revenue equally between the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the GNU in Khartoum. To monitor this agreement, the Security Council passed Resolution 1590 which authorized a 10,000 strong peacekeeping force to be sent to Southern Sudan. This sounds like a solid basis for sustained peace, but Eric Reeves, one of the leading experts on Sudan, has argued that the National Congress Party (NCP) – the current ruling party which constitutes the vast majority of the GNU – has attempted to renege their promises by withholding key ministry positions from the SPLM and creating “shadow bureaucracies that will ensure real power, of all kinds, won’t be shared.” Reeves believes that the most important implication of this manipulation will be that the GoSS will be unable to collect its share of oil revenues which are vital to the rebuilding of Southern Sudan.
At the height of the Second Sudanese Civil War elite struggles in Khartoum once again gave way to a series of military coups with Nimeiry being ousted in 1985, and his successor, Sadiq al-Mahdi, being deposed on June 30th, 1989 by Omar al-Bashir, the current Sudanese President. To consolidate his power, al-Bashir purged tens of thousands of people in the army, police, and civil service, banned political opposition and trade unions, and introduced amputation and stoning as part of the expansion of Sharia law. With the government of Sudan now pushing the Islamic agenda, al-Bashir gave shelter to Osama bin Laden in 1991 who used his time to strengthen the fledgling Al Qaeda and train fundamentalist recruits before he was expelled in 1996 under pressure from foreign governments.
In addition to al-Bashir’s infamous legacy of civil war, suppression of human rights, and protection of terrorists, further violence emerged in Sudan under his rule when a rebellion in the east of the country broke out in early 2005 while the government was attempting to negotiate the CPA. Supported by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from Darfur, the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions formed a coalition to push the government for regional autonomy and oil revenue after they had been excluded from pursuing their demands as part of the CPA negotiations. Many of the Beja ethnic group had been in rebellion for over a decade, but by joining a coalition in 2005 as the Eastern Front, they became a coherent force. After carrying out some successful attacks on government positions, and threatening to halt the flow of oil by destroying the connecting pipeline to Port Sudan, 20 protesters were killed and hundreds detained without trail under the orders of Khartoum. Eventually, Eritrea was able to bring both sides to the table in October 2006 to sign the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) which plans on bringing development money to the region in the coming years.
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Big thanks to Dave for putting together this information. The complete backgrounder (with citations) can be found here.
- sara
